RELIEF OF NAUSHERA, JHANGAR AND KOTLI

General

1.         General Butcher, the COAS was confident of accomplishing the tasks as envisaged at the strategic level. However, he was particulary concerned about the situation at Poonch and its relief. The reasons were: -

(a)       Poonch had a large number of ex-servicemen serving in Pakistan Army who had recently deserted with arms.

(b)       There were atleast 2000 serving soldiers from Poonch in Pakistan Army and a mass desertion was likely. Thus the number of hostiles were further likely to increase.

(c)        Pakistan did not place any physical obstacle along Poonch enabling the raiders to  drive motor vehicles right upto the border and easily infiltrate using the hill tracks.

(d)       In this region, the hostiles could easily use the tribesmen’s dispersal tactics.

(e)       For the  regular arms it was more difficult to fight with guerillas then with another regular army.

The Plan

3.         Major General Kalwant Singh, GOC, Jammu and Kashmir Division prepared a plan for rapid relief of Naushera, Jhangar, Kotli, Mirpur and Poonch. It was as under: -

(a)       50 Para Brigade to move at 0600 hours on 16 Nov 47 speedily on axis Akhnur– Beri Pattan – Naushera –  Jhangar – Kotli and Mirpur. Naushera to be secured on 16 Nov. Firm base to be established at Jhangar on 17 Nov, relieving Kotli on 18 Nov and Mirpur by 20 Nov 47.

(b)       Two battalions ex 161 Infantry Brigade to strike from Uri on 18 Nov 47 towards Poonch, reaching Poonch on the same day. After reinforcing Poonch garrison, the  rest of the brigade to fall back to Uri.

(c)        268 Infantry Brigade to take over protection of the following lines of communication with effect from 0600 hours on 17 Nov 47 :-

(i)            Jammu – Kathua.

(ii)          Jammu – Bahihal.

(iii)       Jammu – Beri Pattan.

4.         Despite observations and disagreements with the plan, Major General Kalwant stayed firm on his plans.

Execution

5.         Advance to Kotli.

(a)       Beri Pattan was secured by B company, 1 Patiala for advance of column ex-50 Para Brigade.

(b)       On 16 Nov, 50 Para Brigade reached Beri Pattan and crossed the Nala the next day when the ford was ready.

(c)        Tactical recce of road Beri Pattan – Naushera revealed many road blocks. But the column pushed on till Naushera.

(d)       State forces at Naushera had already repulsed the enemy attack on night 16 / 17 Nov.  After a brief engagement on 18 Nov, the  enemy at Naushera fled.

(e)       The remaining two companies advanced to Jhangar at 0700 hours on  19 Nov.  Jhangar was occupied without opposition but further advance to Kotli was slowed down by numerous road blocks and sniping. Covering fire by armoured cars proved to be helpful in overcoming the opposition en route.

(f)        Tactical recconnaisance and intelligence reports revealed that Ban bridge South of Kotli was likely to be occupied and approximately two hundred raiders were concentrated at Kotli. On 26 Nov, own troops occupied Kotli garrison.

(g)       Mirpur could not to be relieved and was evacuated on 25 Nov.

(h)       Columns from Uri to Poonch were attacked and pushed back by the enemy to Uri and hence the plan of advance from Kotli to Poonch was given up.

(j)         As the line of communication from Jammu was stretched too far after the fall of Mirpur, it was decided not to hold Kotli but to fall back to Jhangar after evacuating refugees and the state forces at Kotli.

6.         Advance to Poonch.

(a)       Having relieved Naushera, Jhangar and Kotli , operations for the relief of Poonch were envisaged.

 (b)       Plan.

(i)         161 Infantry Brigade comprising of 1 (Para) Kumaon, 2 Dogra less two companies, two troops ex-7 Light Cavalry, 17 Mountain Battery and one machine gun platoon of 1 Mahar to proceed for relief of Poonch from Uri on 20 Nov.     

(ii)        1 Sikh and a troop of 323 field battery to be left behind for defence of the firm base at Uri.

(c)        Due to a demolished bridge, a portion of the vehicle column of 200 vehicles got separated from the main force making it prone to enemy delaying actions.

(a)          On 21 Nov, the main column reached Kahuta but found that the bridge at

Kahuta was destroyed by the state forces mistaking this column for the enemy.

(e)       This was a terrible set back to the operations as they got engaged in making of a ford.

(f)        The Disastrous Ambush. Meanwhile the separated vehicle column faced a road block on 21 Nov during their advance. This road block was well covered by fire. The halted vehicle did not disperse but got cluttered instead posing a good target to the enemy who was occupying important heights in the area and was well prepared. The infantry elements made a futile effort to assault a near-by feature. Owing to the road bends and narrow roads, the armoured cars at the tail could not fetch up to the front. They were also assaulted and damaged. Finally, these armoured cars were used to ferry casualties. A looting party which was hiding all the while in the Nala below sprung into action and ransacked the vehicles before setting them on fire. In this ambush, Indian casualties were 16 killed, 14 injured and 24 vehicles damaged /destroyed.

(g)       After getting news of the ambush, Brigadier Sen ordered 1 (Para) Kumaon less a company to join the Poonch garrison and the rest to rush back to Uri. This column reached the ambush site on 23 Nov.

(g)       From Srinagar,  two companies of 4 Kumaon were despatched as relief for the ambush victims via Uri. This column left Srinagar at 0330 hours on 22 Nov but reached the ambush site only on 23 Nov alongwith the column of Brigadier Sen.

7.         Attack on Uri Picquet.

(a)       While the Poonch column was facing the mishap, taking advantage , about 900 enemy launched an all out attack on a small picquet isolated across Jhelum, during night 22-23 Nov. Uri garrison, including this picquet was held by 1 Sikh.

(b)       The selection of the objective by the enemy was remarkable due to  the following reasons:-

(i)         The picquet was isolated across Jhelum with a bridge previously destroyed. Thus any reinforcement could take a minimum of two hours to  reach.

(ii)        Occupation  of the picquet was very vital for defence of Uri.

(iii)       The picquet was not held in strength being manned by one JCO and 20 OR.

(c)        The troops at this picquet, despite all odds fought valiantly, holding back repeated waves of enemy assaults.

(d)       No reinforcements could be provided due to heavy commitment. The Quarter Master Platoon consisting of cooks and sweepers under the Quarter Master, Captain Joginder Singh volunteered to assist the picquet. This reinforcement rushed to the picquet with dashing speed and war cries.

(e)       The stiff resistance by the small picquet and the spirited movements of the reinforcing Quarter Master Platoon, demoralised the enemy and the enemy abandoned leaving behind a 3” Mortar.

(f)        Thus a vital post was saved by the gallant action of troops of 1 Sikh.

8.         Difficulties Faced.

(a)       The roads Kotli – Jhangar and Poonch – Uri were very narrow and  had numerous hair pin bends. The raiders established road blocks and demolished the wooden bridges to seriously affect the move.

(b)       There was a paucity  of troops. 50 Para Brigade was much below its normal strength as the Mussalman companies had gone over to Pakistan. For the advance to Kotli, the Brigade had only five companies which got stretched over 64 kms.  Similarly, 1 Sikh alone held Uri.

(c)        Consequent to the mass desertion by Muslim troops of the state forces, the Muslim company in Kotli garrison was kept disarmed causing demoralisation of the garrison and also reducing the fighting strength.

9.         Air Efforts.    Efforts of the RIAF during the relief operations were highly commendable. These included the following actions: -

(a)       Timely and precise drop of supplies, ammunition, arms, spares of arms and equipment.

(b)       Effective tactical reconnaissance.

(c)        Highly accurate bombing to an extent of destroying buses and a moving towed mountain gun.

(d)       Enemy positions were indicated by ground forces and effectively engaged by  own aircraft.

(e)       Despite getting shot at the pilots accomplished their task gallantly.

(f)        A large number of sorties were carried out from Air Force stations at Srinagar and Amritsar as the air strip at Jammu was short.

10.         Peculiarities.

(a)       Road blocks were very effectively used by the hostiles. The Indian troops approaching Kotli from the South faced 47 road blocks.

(b)       The enemy in Kotli area proved to be poor marksmen and poor tacticians. Apparently, his force did not include the regular or Pathan elements.

(c)        Acute shortage of troops did not deter own troops from accomplishing assigned tasks. For instance, despite having only two companies left, 50 Para Brigade advanced to Kotli to occupy it as per the task initially assigned.

(d)       Troops of 1 Sikh displayed exemplary courage, as only 20 people held the post against 900 raiders.

(e)       1 Sikh also displayed  espirit -de-corps of a high order. When the picquet was attacked and no troops were available for reinforcement, the Quarter Master Platoon comprising mostly of cooks and sweepers volunteered to assist the  troops  under assault. They rushed to the attacked picquet spiritedly and demoralised the enemy.

(f)        Peculiarities of the Enemy in Uri Sector.        

(i)            The hostiles were adept at irregular warfare.     

(ii)          He attacked the rear of the Poonch column.

(iii)       The attack on Uri picquet displayed that the enemy was a keen tactician.  His selection of the objective was remarkable.

(iv)       Intelligence reports revealed that his headquarters was at Lalanka and supplies must have come from Palandri which was 64 km away. This shows an efficient logistics network.

Conclusion

11.       Before Nov 47, the Indian Army and the Air Force had successfully completed the preliminary task of rescue of Kashmir valley, Jhangar, Naushera and Kotli. Most of these tasks were im promptu battles. The forthcoming operations  were all the more demanding.