Operation Gulmarg in Jammu & Kashmir

Introduction.            The main invasion of raiders into J and K  that was planned and launched by the Army HQs of Pakistan was called ‘Operation Gulmarg’.  The planning and preparation for Operation Gulmarg reportedly commenced as early as Aug 1947 as soon as or even prior to the subcontinent’s independence from British rule. The initial steps involved mustering of a large tribal force for the operation to be later supplemented by regular troops if required.  The broad outline plan was as follows: -

(a)       The Main Thrust.    Six Lashkars to advance along the main road Muzzafarabad to Srinagar via Domel, Uri and Baramulla with the specific task to capture Srinagar airport and advance beyond to Banihal Pass.

(b)       Subsidiary Thrust 1.          Two Lashkars to secure the right flank of the main force by advancing from Haji Pir pass directly to Gulmarg.

(c)        Subsidiary Thrust 2.          A similar  force of two Lashkars to advance from Tithwal through the Nastachun Pass to capture Sopore, Handwara and Bandipur.

(d)       Another force of ten Lashkars to operate in Poonch, Bhimbar and Rawalkot area with the aim of capturing Poonch, Rajauri and then advance to Jammu.

(e)       The D day was fixed as 22 Oct 1947, on which date, the various lashkars were to cross into J and K territory.

(f)        7 Infantry Division of Pakistan army concentrated in area Murree-Abbotabad by night of 21 Oct, ready to move into J and K to back up the tribal lashkars and consolidate their hold on the valley.

(g)       One Infantry Brigade was also held ready in Sialkot to move on to Jammu.

 2.        Factors Favouring Operation Gulmarg.           The factors, which favoured launching of Operation Gulmarg, were as follows: -

(a)       Communications.   As major communications emanated from the West, that is the direction adopted by the aggressor, easy move into the valley was facilitated.           

(b)       Opposition.  The combat fitness of the Jammu and Kashmir StateForces could not be graded at par with regular forces. Therefore, a minimal degree of resistance was expected by the hostiles.

(c)        Opposition by Indian Army.         Opposition by the Indian Army was not expected due to the following reasons :-

            (i)         Heavy commitments in  internal security duties.

(ii)          Unfavourable time and space due to inadequate communication

 system.

            (iii)       Initial raids in Sept 1947 evoked no reaction from India.

(d)       Surprise.       Surprise was completely in favour of the aggressor as the Jammu and Kashmir StateForces as well as the administration, being in a state of disarray, were likely to be caught unawares. The intelligence organisation in the state was also not effective.

(e)       Subversion. Subversion of loyalty of a large number of Muslims in the State forces had undermined the fighting potential of these units. This was further reduced due to the dispersed deployment.