RELIEF OF NAUSHERA, JHANGAR AND KOTLI

General

1.         General Butcher, the COAS was confident of accomplishing the tasks as envisaged at the strategic level. However, he was particulary concerned about the situation at Poonch and its relief. The reasons were: -

(a)       Poonch had a large number of ex-servicemen serving in Pakistan Army who had recently deserted with arms.

(b)       There were atleast 2000 serving soldiers from Poonch in Pakistan Army and a mass desertion was likely. Thus the number of hostiles were further likely to increase.

(c)        Pakistan did not place any physical obstacle along Poonch enabling the raiders to  drive motor vehicles right upto the border and easily infiltrate using the hill tracks.

(d)       In this region, the hostiles could easily use the tribesmen’s dispersal tactics.

(e)       For the  regular arms it was more difficult to fight with guerillas then with another regular army.

The Plan

3.         Major General Kalwant Singh, GOC, Jammu and Kashmir Division prepared a plan for rapid relief of Naushera, Jhangar, Kotli, Mirpur and Poonch. It was as under: -

(a)       50 Para Brigade to move at 0600 hours on 16 Nov 47 speedily on axis Akhnur– Beri Pattan – Naushera –  Jhangar – Kotli and Mirpur. Naushera to be secured on 16 Nov. Firm base to be established at Jhangar on 17 Nov, relieving Kotli on 18 Nov and Mirpur by 20 Nov 47.

(b)       Two battalions ex 161 Infantry Brigade to strike from Uri on 18 Nov 47 towards Poonch, reaching Poonch on the same day. After reinforcing Poonch garrison, the  rest of the brigade to fall back to Uri.

(c)        268 Infantry Brigade to take over protection of the following lines of communication with effect from 0600 hours on 17 Nov 47 :-

(i)            Jammu – Kathua.

(ii)          Jammu – Bahihal.

(iii)       Jammu – Beri Pattan.

4.         Despite observations and disagreements with the plan, Major General Kalwant stayed firm on his plans.

Execution

5.         Advance to Kotli.

(a)       Beri Pattan was secured by B company, 1 Patiala for advance of column ex-50 Para Brigade.

(b)       On 16 Nov, 50 Para Brigade reached Beri Pattan and crossed the Nala the next day when the ford was ready.

(c)        Tactical recce of road Beri Pattan – Naushera revealed many road blocks. But the column pushed on till Naushera.

(d)       State forces at Naushera had already repulsed the enemy attack on night 16 / 17 Nov.  After a brief engagement on 18 Nov, the  enemy at Naushera fled.

(e)       The remaining two companies advanced to Jhangar at 0700 hours on  19 Nov.  Jhangar was occupied without opposition but further advance to Kotli was slowed down by numerous road blocks and sniping. Covering fire by armoured cars proved to be helpful in overcoming the opposition en route.

(f)        Tactical recconnaisance and intelligence reports revealed that Ban bridge South of Kotli was likely to be occupied and approximately two hundred raiders were concentrated at Kotli. On 26 Nov, own troops occupied Kotli garrison.

(g)       Mirpur could not to be relieved and was evacuated on 25 Nov.

(h)       Columns from Uri to Poonch were attacked and pushed back by the enemy to Uri and hence the plan of advance from Kotli to Poonch was given up.

(j)         As the line of communication from Jammu was stretched too far after the fall of Mirpur, it was decided not to hold Kotli but to fall back to Jhangar after evacuating refugees and the state forces at Kotli.

6.         Advance to Poonch.

(a)       Having relieved Naushera, Jhangar and Kotli , operations for the relief of Poonch were envisaged.

 (b)       Plan.

(i)         161 Infantry Brigade comprising of 1 (Para) Kumaon, 2 Dogra less two companies, two troops ex-7 Light Cavalry, 17 Mountain Battery and one machine gun platoon of 1 Mahar to proceed for relief of Poonch from Uri on 20 Nov.     

(ii)        1 Sikh and a troop of 323 field battery to be left behind for defence of the firm base at Uri.

(c)        Due to a demolished bridge, a portion of the vehicle column of 200 vehicles got separated from the main force making it prone to enemy delaying actions.

(a)          On 21 Nov, the main column reached Kahuta but found that the bridge at

Kahuta was destroyed by the state forces mistaking this column for the enemy.

(e)       This was a terrible set back to the operations as they got engaged in making of a ford.

(f)        The Disastrous Ambush. Meanwhile the separated vehicle column faced a road block on 21 Nov during their advance. This road block was well covered by fire. The halted vehicle did not disperse but got cluttered instead posing a good target to the enemy who was occupying important heights in the area and was well prepared. The infantry elements made a futile effort to assault a near-by feature. Owing to the road bends and narrow roads, the armoured cars at the tail could not fetch up to the front. They were also assaulted and damaged. Finally, these armoured cars were used to ferry casualties. A looting party which was hiding all the while in the Nala below sprung into action and ransacked the vehicles before setting them on fire. In this ambush, Indian casualties were 16 killed, 14 injured and 24 vehicles damaged /destroyed.

(g)       After getting news of the ambush, Brigadier Sen ordered 1 (Para) Kumaon less a company to join the Poonch garrison and the rest to rush back to Uri. This column reached the ambush site on 23 Nov.

(g)       From Srinagar,  two companies of 4 Kumaon were despatched as relief for the ambush victims via Uri. This column left Srinagar at 0330 hours on 22 Nov but reached the ambush site only on 23 Nov alongwith the column of Brigadier Sen.

7.         Attack on Uri Picquet.

(a)       While the Poonch column was facing the mishap, taking advantage , about 900 enemy launched an all out attack on a small picquet isolated across Jhelum, during night 22-23 Nov. Uri garrison, including this picquet was held by 1 Sikh.

(b)       The selection of the objective by the enemy was remarkable due to  the following reasons:-

(i)         The picquet was isolated across Jhelum with a bridge previously destroyed. Thus any reinforcement could take a minimum of two hours to  reach.

(ii)        Occupation  of the picquet was very vital for defence of Uri.

(iii)       The picquet was not held in strength being manned by one JCO and 20 OR.

(c)        The troops at this picquet, despite all odds fought valiantly, holding back repeated waves of enemy assaults.

(d)       No reinforcements could be provided due to heavy commitment. The Quarter Master Platoon consisting of cooks and sweepers under the Quarter Master, Captain Joginder Singh volunteered to assist the picquet. This reinforcement rushed to the picquet with dashing speed and war cries.

(e)       The stiff resistance by the small picquet and the spirited movements of the reinforcing Quarter Master Platoon, demoralised the enemy and the enemy abandoned leaving behind a 3” Mortar.

(f)        Thus a vital post was saved by the gallant action of troops of 1 Sikh.

8.         Difficulties Faced.

(a)       The roads Kotli – Jhangar and Poonch – Uri were very narrow and  had numerous hair pin bends. The raiders established road blocks and demolished the wooden bridges to seriously affect the move.

(b)       There was a paucity  of troops. 50 Para Brigade was much below its normal strength as the Mussalman companies had gone over to Pakistan. For the advance to Kotli, the Brigade had only five companies which got stretched over 64 kms.  Similarly, 1 Sikh alone held Uri.

(c)        Consequent to the mass desertion by Muslim troops of the state forces, the Muslim company in Kotli garrison was kept disarmed causing demoralisation of the garrison and also reducing the fighting strength.

9.         Air Efforts.    Efforts of the RIAF during the relief operations were highly commendable. These included the following actions: -

(a)       Timely and precise drop of supplies, ammunition, arms, spares of arms and equipment.

(b)       Effective tactical reconnaissance.

(c)        Highly accurate bombing to an extent of destroying buses and a moving towed mountain gun.

(d)       Enemy positions were indicated by ground forces and effectively engaged by  own aircraft.

(e)       Despite getting shot at the pilots accomplished their task gallantly.

(f)        A large number of sorties were carried out from Air Force stations at Srinagar and Amritsar as the air strip at Jammu was short.

10.         Peculiarities.

(a)       Road blocks were very effectively used by the hostiles. The Indian troops approaching Kotli from the South faced 47 road blocks.

(b)       The enemy in Kotli area proved to be poor marksmen and poor tacticians. Apparently, his force did not include the regular or Pathan elements.

(c)        Acute shortage of troops did not deter own troops from accomplishing assigned tasks. For instance, despite having only two companies left, 50 Para Brigade advanced to Kotli to occupy it as per the task initially assigned.

(d)       Troops of 1 Sikh displayed exemplary courage, as only 20 people held the post against 900 raiders.

(e)       1 Sikh also displayed  espirit -de-corps of a high order. When the picquet was attacked and no troops were available for reinforcement, the Quarter Master Platoon comprising mostly of cooks and sweepers volunteered to assist the  troops  under assault. They rushed to the attacked picquet spiritedly and demoralised the enemy.

(f)        Peculiarities of the Enemy in Uri Sector.        

(i)            The hostiles were adept at irregular warfare.     

(ii)          He attacked the rear of the Poonch column.

(iii)       The attack on Uri picquet displayed that the enemy was a keen tactician.  His selection of the objective was remarkable.

(iv)       Intelligence reports revealed that his headquarters was at Lalanka and supplies must have come from Palandri which was 64 km away. This shows an efficient logistics network.

Conclusion

11.       Before Nov 47, the Indian Army and the Air Force had successfully completed the preliminary task of rescue of Kashmir valley, Jhangar, Naushera and Kotli. Most of these tasks were im promptu battles. The forthcoming operations  were all the more demanding.

RELIEF OPERATIONS IN JAMMU SECTOR

Serious Situation in Jammu Province

(a)       Hostiles had seized a considerable stretch of territory close to the Pakistan border.

(b)       In early Oct 47, parties of armed Pakistan ex-servicemen with a varying strength of 10 to 100 carried out a number of raids. The aim was two fold: -

            (i)         Pin down the garrisons of the state forces.

           (ii)        Serve as a feint for the main thrust along the Kohla – Srinagar road.

(c)        The raiders were successful for the following causes: -

            (i)         Turbulent Muslims were provoked on the Poonch-Mirpur borders and these were                      supplied with arms and ammunition.

                (ii)           Muslim components of Jammu and Kashmir forces in Poonch – Mirpur sector deserted with arms and                      ammunition and joined the raiders on 18 Oct 47.

Battle of Shalateng

Introduction.            The battle of Badgam ensured security of the Srinagar airfield and facilitated further build up of forces. 161 Infantry Brigade could thus think of the defence of the Srinagar town as well as advance towards Baramulla for pushing back the raiders. This was planned through what later came to be known as the Battle of Shalateng. An illustration of the operation is attached as Appendix E.

1.         Plan of Operation.

            (a)       Forces Available for the Attack.

(i)            1 Sikh.

(ii)          1 Kumaon .

                        (iii)       Two armoured cars of 7 Cavalry in Bandipur area.

            (b)       1 Sikh was to stay in position and fix the enemy at Srinagar.

(c)        1 Kumaon was to infiltrate westwards and position itself to the South of the raiders from the direction of Pattan, and launch an attack on the code word, “Go”.

(d)       The armoured cars which were to be the main element in the attack were to move from Krahom to Sumbal through Shadipur and join the main Baramulla – Srinagar road at Shalateng .   By appearing suddenly in the rear they were to deliver the coup-de-grace.

(e)       The critical part of the plan was the ability of the armoured cars to negotiate the road between Krahom to Sumbal which had some weak bridges.

2.     Course of Battle.    The battle progressed as follows : -

.        

(a)       The armoured cars successfully negotiated the stretch between Krahom and Sumbal and 1 Kumaon was ordered to infiltrate westwards.

(b)     1 Kumaon and the armoured cars having reached respective positions, the code-word, “Go” was given.

  

(c)        The raiders were caught in the fire from three directions, the armoured cars in the West, 1 Kumaon in the South and 1 Sikh in the East.  Air strikes were also carried out on enemy positions.

(e)       The sudden appearance of the armoured cars in the rear followed by the multi directional attacks broke the enemy’s will to fight and he broke ranks.

(f)        The advance was pursued towards Pattan and Baramulla hich was captured the very next day.

The Battle of Badgam

    The battle of Badgam was fought on 03 Nov 1947. Two companies of 4 Kumaon were deployed on the hill features overlooking Badgam. As no raider activities were reported, one company was withdrawn at about 1400 hours. At about 1430 hours, half an hour prior to the time given for the withdrawal, the Company Commander of the second company, Major Som Nath Sharma reported that his company was under fire from the houses in Badgam village. Shortly, radio communication with Major Sharma was disrupted. Greatly out numbered by the enemy by as much as 7:1, the company of 4 Kumaon held out effectively engaging the enemy. The forward platoons of the company were over run. But Maj Sharma held out with the depth platoon. He was later killed by a mortar bomb. The officer was subsequently awarded the Maha Vir Chakra. The situation was restored as reinforcements arrived by 1700 hours. Air support was also made available for the operation.  An illustration of the operation is attached as Appendix D.

 1.     Causes of Success.         The causes of own success can by analysed as under :-

(a)       Though not tasked to fight to the last man and last round, the 4 Kumaon company did so, averting a running fight with attendant disadvantages.

(b)       Effective air support was provided which had as much of a psychological effect as fire power effect.

(c)        Sound leadership by Major Sharma, who realising the threat to Srinagar airfield on the fall of Badgam decided to hold his position inspite of heavy losses.

(d)       Injury to the Pathan leader, Khurshed denied him effective control of the operations. This also exposed a weakness of the raiding force which was rendered rudderless once its leader was ineffective.

2.   Factors Which Saved Srinagar.   To sum up, the factors which saved Srinagar from the onslaught of the raiders in Oct 1947 were as follows : -

(a)          The delay imposed by the state forces at Muzaffarabad.

(b)          The delay imposed by Brigadier Rajinder Singh’s party at Uri.

(c)        Time wasted by the raiders in their rampage at Baramulla.

(d)       1 Sikh’s delaying action at Baramulla and Pattan.

(e)       4 Kumaon’s heroic stand at Badgam.

ACCESSION TO INDIA AND FLY IN OF THE ARMY

Accession to India

1.         By the latter half of Oct 1947 the Govt of India was in close touch with the situation in Kashmir. The Maharaja’s government sought India’s help in controlling it. Direct assistance of the Indian Army was ruled out till J&K acceded to India.

2.         On 22 Oct 1947, the Maharaja specifically requested for Indian troops to be sent to Kashmir to rescue it from the invaders. The following problems were visualised in fulfilling this requirement :  

(a)       No plans were  made for induction of troops into Kashmir. Srinagar was more than 480 km from the nearest Indian border.

(b)       Indian troops were committed in refugee operations and  internal security duties.

(c)        With time at a premium, air transport was the only feasible means of transporting troops. Srinagar landing ground was not maintained and fell short of the required standards for landing fully loaded transport aircrafts.

(d)       There were no depots, ancillary services or lines of communication existing there.

3.         The Secretary, Ministry of States, Govt of India, Mr VP Menon flew to Jammu on 26 Oct and returned with the formal Instrument of Accession signed by the Maharaja, after which the state became an integral part of the Indian Dominion. Hence Pakistan should have stopped the invasion of J&K, which it did not.

Induction of Indian troops

4.         Troops had to be mustered and prepared to be sent to Srinagar urgently. The choice fell on 1 Sikh, stationed nearby at Gurgaon, commanded by Lt Col DR Rai.

5.         The tasks allotted to 1 Sikh were :-

(a)       Hold Srinagar airfield and civil aviation wireless station at all costs.

(b)       Ensure immunity of Srinagar air field from enemy action, thereby

facilitating further landings.

(c)        Having achieved this, take measures to push back the raiders from

Srinagar.

(d)       Assist local govt to maintain law  and order  in Srinagar.

Difficulties Faced by Own Forces

6.         The difficulties experienced by the Indian Army in the initial stages of launching operations in Kashmir in October 1947 were as follows : -

            (a)       Lack of intelligence on enemy strength and deployment.

            (b)       Non existence of secure land communications.

            (c)        Non availability of maps of the area.

(d)       Pre-occupation with internal security operations in Punjab and other parts of the country.

(e)       Preoccupation with the reorganisation of the Army into Indian and Pakistan Army.

7.         The problems faced in the mustering of units for induction into Jammu and Kashmir in October 1947 were as under : -

(a)       Widespread deployment of units on internal security duties in northern India.

(b)       Units were split into platoon and company sized picquets.

(c)        The dispersed picquets lacked communications and thus it was time consuming to recall them.

Fall of Domel and Baramulla

Fall of Domel and Baramulla.

(a)       Early in the morning of 22 Oct 47, the main column of raiders crossed the frontier from Garhi Habibullah and attacked Muzzaffarabad.

(b)       The Poonchi Muslims of 4 J and K Infantry, located at Muzzafarabad revolted and killed their comrades, thereby exposing the road to Srinagar.

(c)        Brigadier Rajender SIngh, the Chief of Staff of J and K Force, on hearing this, rushed with about 200 personnel of the rear parties of battalions with demolition explosives to Uri, to check the onslaught. The Uri bridge, East of the town ,was blown up by him to delay the enemy’s advance. Brigadier Rajender SIngh was killed in a rear guard action while continuing to delay the raiders at Dewan Mandir. He was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra. He and his men delayed the enemy by four valuable days.

(d)       The raiders entered Baramulla town on 26 Oct 1947 in the evening and were engaged in loot, plunder and rape . It is reported that many raiders turned back home from there, saying they would return after depositing their loot. The advance to Srinagar was thus held up by a few crucial days.

Operation Gulmarg in Jammu & Kashmir

Introduction.            The main invasion of raiders into J and K  that was planned and launched by the Army HQs of Pakistan was called ‘Operation Gulmarg’.  The planning and preparation for Operation Gulmarg reportedly commenced as early as Aug 1947 as soon as or even prior to the subcontinent’s independence from British rule. The initial steps involved mustering of a large tribal force for the operation to be later supplemented by regular troops if required.  The broad outline plan was as follows: -

(a)       The Main Thrust.    Six Lashkars to advance along the main road Muzzafarabad to Srinagar via Domel, Uri and Baramulla with the specific task to capture Srinagar airport and advance beyond to Banihal Pass.

(b)       Subsidiary Thrust 1.          Two Lashkars to secure the right flank of the main force by advancing from Haji Pir pass directly to Gulmarg.

(c)        Subsidiary Thrust 2.          A similar  force of two Lashkars to advance from Tithwal through the Nastachun Pass to capture Sopore, Handwara and Bandipur.

(d)       Another force of ten Lashkars to operate in Poonch, Bhimbar and Rawalkot area with the aim of capturing Poonch, Rajauri and then advance to Jammu.

(e)       The D day was fixed as 22 Oct 1947, on which date, the various lashkars were to cross into J and K territory.

(f)        7 Infantry Division of Pakistan army concentrated in area Murree-Abbotabad by night of 21 Oct, ready to move into J and K to back up the tribal lashkars and consolidate their hold on the valley.

(g)       One Infantry Brigade was also held ready in Sialkot to move on to Jammu.

 2.        Factors Favouring Operation Gulmarg.           The factors, which favoured launching of Operation Gulmarg, were as follows: -

(a)       Communications.   As major communications emanated from the West, that is the direction adopted by the aggressor, easy move into the valley was facilitated.           

(b)       Opposition.  The combat fitness of the Jammu and Kashmir StateForces could not be graded at par with regular forces. Therefore, a minimal degree of resistance was expected by the hostiles.

(c)        Opposition by Indian Army.         Opposition by the Indian Army was not expected due to the following reasons :-

            (i)         Heavy commitments in  internal security duties.

(ii)          Unfavourable time and space due to inadequate communication

 system.

            (iii)       Initial raids in Sept 1947 evoked no reaction from India.

(d)       Surprise.       Surprise was completely in favour of the aggressor as the Jammu and Kashmir StateForces as well as the administration, being in a state of disarray, were likely to be caught unawares. The intelligence organisation in the state was also not effective.

(e)       Subversion. Subversion of loyalty of a large number of Muslims in the State forces had undermined the fighting potential of these units. This was further reduced due to the dispersed deployment.